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Abstract
We demonstrate that a practical concurrent language can be
extended in a natural way with information security mech-
anisms that provably enforce strong information security
guarantees.WeextendtheX10concurrentprogramminglan-
guage with coarse-grained information-ﬂow control. Central
to X10 concurrency abstractions is the notion of a place: a
container for data and computation. We associate a security
level with each place, and restrict each place to store only
data appropriate for that security level. When places interact
only with other places at the same security level, then our
security mechanisms impose no restrictions. When places
of differing security levels interact, our information security
analysis prevents potentially dangerous information ﬂows,
including information ﬂow through covert scheduling chan-
nels. The X10 concurrency mechanisms simplify reasoning
about information ﬂow in concurrent programs.
We present a static analysis that enforces a noninterfer-
ence-based extensional information security condition in a
calculus that captures the key aspects of X10’s place ab-
straction and async-ﬁnish parallelism. We extend this secu-
rityanalysistosupportmanyofX10’slanguagefeatures,and
have implemented a prototype compiler for the resulting lan-
guage.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.3 [Programming
Languages]:LanguageConstructsandFeatures—Concurrent
programming structures; D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Secu-
rity and Protection—Information ﬂow controls
Keywords Language-basedsecurity;information-ﬂowcon-
trol; X10.
1. Introduction
Enforcement of strong information security guarantees for
concurrent programs poses both a challenge and an oppor-
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tunity. The challenge is that, given current hardware trends
towards increased parallelism, and the large number of com-
puter systems that handle data of varying sensitivity, it is
increasingly important to reason about and enforce informa-
tion security guarantees in the presence of concurrency. Al-
though progress has been made towards this end, there are
not yet practical enforcement mechanisms and usable im-
plementations. The opportunity is to adapt new and existing
language abstractions for concurrency to reason precisely
about information security in concurrent programs. Infor-
mation security, like concurrency, is intimately connected to
notions of dependency [1]. As such, there is potential for
synergy between language mechanisms for concurrency, and
enforcementmechanismsforinformationsecurityinconcur-
rent programs.
TheX10programminglanguage[10]isanobject-oriented
language with abstractions to support ﬁne-grained concur-
rency. Central to X10 concurrency abstractions is the notion
of a place. A place is a computational unit that contains
computation and data. For example, each core of a single
machine or each machine within a distributed system might
be represented by a different place. Data held at a place,
and computation running at a place, are said to be “local”
to the place. Places are ﬁrst-class in X10. Multiple threads
of execution, which in X10 are known as activities, may
execute concurrently within a place. Activities at the same
place share memory, and an activity may only access data
at the place where it is located. Places may communicate
using message passing, but X10 is designed to discourage
excessive communication between places, since this reduces
concurrency.
We extend X10 language abstractions for concurrency
with information security mechanisms, and call the resulting
language SX10 (for Secure X10). Speciﬁcally, in SX10 each
place is associated with a security level, and a (completely
static) security analysis ensures that each place stores only
data appropriate for that security level. Thus, all computa-
tion within a place is on data at the same security level. In the
case where places communicate only with other places at the
samesecuritylevel, thenoursecuritymechanisms donotim-
pose any restrictions on programs. Communication between
places with different security levels may pose security con-
cerns, but because message-passing communication is used
1between places, it is relatively simple to restrict such com-
munication: the security analysis ensures that data may be
sent to another place only when the security level of the des-
tination is sufﬁciently high. Interaction between places may
inﬂuence the scheduling of activities at a place, leading to
potential covert information channels; our security analysis
tracks and controls these covert channels.
We believe that this coarse-grained approach to provid-
ing information security in concurrent programs is simple,
practical, and useful. All data at a place is at the same se-
curity level, which both provides simplicity of reasoning for
the programmer, and allows a high degree of concurrency
within a place without compromising security.
There are many highly concurrent systems that compute
with data of varying sensitivity that ﬁt naturally into such a
model. The following are some examples.
 Machine learning A service such as Pandora processes
a large amount of public data, which is then used to
make recommendations to individual users based on their
private usage data. All public data is at the same security
level and processing it is highly parallel; data from many
users are processed in parallel.
 Social networks Users specify that some posts are visi-
ble to all other users, and some are visible only to friends.
Many users may use the system concurrently.
 Shopping carts An online shopping cart collects infor-
mation about items ordered, which may appear in low-
security logs, and credit card information, which must
remain secure. Many customers may use the system con-
currently.
Motivating example Reasoning about information secu-
rity in the presence of concurrency can be subtle. Consider
Program 1, which exhibits a timing channel.
1 at Low f
2 async f
3 // Activity 1
4 if (hi > 0) longComputation();
5 output ``pos'';
6 g
7 // Activity 2
8 mediumComputation(); output ``nonpos'';
9 g
Program 1.
Assume that memory location hi contains high-security
(e.g., secret) data. Instruction at Low s indicates that s is ex-
ecuted at a place called Low, which we assume is allowed to
handle only low-security data. Outputs at place Low should
not reveal high-security information. Instruction async s cre-
ates a new activity to execute statement s, and the current
activity continues with the following statement. Thus, the
if statement and subsequent output of the string ``pos'' ex-
ecute concurrently with the output ``nonpos'' statement. If
high-security memory location hi is positive, then Activity
1 outputs ``pos'' after a long time; otherwise it outputs ``pos''
immediately. Activity 2 computes for a medium amount of
time, and outputs ``nonpos''. It is likely that the order of
outputs will reveal secret information, and the program is
thus insecure. This is an example of an internal timing chan-
nel [48], where the order of publicly observable events de-
pends upon high-security information.
Program 1 is not an SX10 program: low-security place
Low is not allowed to hold high-security data, such as that
stored in memory location hi. Suppose, however, that High
is a place that is permitted to hold secret information. Then
Program 2 is a SX10 program and exhibits a similar timing
channel. (It is correctly rejected by our security analysis.)
1 at Low f
2 async f
3 // Activity 1
4 at High f // activity 1 moves to High
5 if (hi > 0) longComputation();
6 g
7 // activity 1 moves back to Low
8 output ``pos'';
9 g
10 // Activity 2
11 mediumComputation(); output ``nonpos'';
12 g
Program 2.
In thisexample, Activity1 moves toplace High in orderto
perform computation on high-security data, before returning
to place Low to perform the output of the string ``pos''.
We assume that the scheduling of activities at each place
depends only on the activities at that place, an assumption
that holds in the X10 2.2 runtime [14]. Nonetheless, in Pro-
gram 2, the scheduling of Activity 2 at place Low depends on
whether Activity 1 is running at Low, which in turn depends
on how long the computation at place High takes. Thus, the
scheduling of output ``pos'' and output ``nonpos'' may be in-
ﬂuenced by high-security data. Our security analysis detects
this potential information ﬂow, and rejects the program.
Program 2 is inherently nondeterministic: it could per-
form the two outputs in either order. The scheduler re-
solves the nondeterminism, but in doing so, may reveal high-
security information—a form of reﬁnement attack [39]. One
way to prevent such reﬁnement attacks is to require that any
observable behavior be deterministic [6, 49]. Our security
analysis requires such observational determinism when the
resolution of nondeterminism may reveal high-security in-
formation.
It is, however, possible to allow some observable nonde-
terminism within a secure concurrent program. Intuitively,
if the resolution of the nondeterminism does not depend
2on high-security information, then observable nondetermin-
ism is secure [31]. If place P does not communicate with
any other places, then, since scheduling is performed per-
place, resolution of nondeterminism at P will not reveal
high-security information. In some cases it is also possible
to allow nondeterminism at place P even if P interacts with
places of higher security levels. Consider Program 3: Activ-
ity 1 executes at place Low concurrently with Activity 2’s ex-
ecution at place High. The nish s instruction executes state-
ment s, and waits until s and all activities spawned by s have
terminatedbeforecontinuingexecution.Thus,Activity3and
Activity 4 execute concurrently at place Low after Activi-
ties 1 and 2 have ﬁnished. Although the order of output ``B''
and output ``C'' is nondeterministic, resolution of this non-
determinism is not inﬂuenced by how long the high-security
computation takes, and so does not reveal high-security in-
formation.
1 at Low f
2 nish f
3 async f
4 // Activity 1
5 output ``A'';
6 g
7 // Activity 2
8 at High f
9 if (hi > 0) longComputation();
10 g
11 g
12 async f
13 // Activity 3
14 output ``B'';
15 g
16 // Activity 4
17 output ``C'';
18 g
Program 3.
Contributions The key contribution of this paper is to
demonstrate that practical and useful concurrency mecha-
nisms can be extended in a natural way with information se-
curity mechanisms that provably enforce strong information
security guarantees. We enforce coarse-grained information-
ﬂow control [39], requiring that every place can store only
data at a single security level. If places interact only with
other places at the same security level, then our security
mechanisms do not restrict concurrency nor require deter-
minism for security. When places of differing security in-
teract, our information security analysis prevents potentially
dangerous information ﬂows by using X10’s concurrency
mechanisms to reason both about data sent between places,
and about how the scheduling of activities at a place may
depend on high-security information.
In Section 2 we present a calculus, based on Feather-
weight X10 [22], that captures key aspects of the X10 place
abstraction, and its async-ﬁnish parallelism. We deﬁne a
knowledge-based noninterference semantic security condi-
tion [2, 12] for this calculus in Section 3, and present a se-
curity analysis that provably enforces it. The language SX10
is the result of extending this analysis to handle many of the
language features of X10. We have implemented a prototype
compiler for SX10 by modifying the X10 compiler, and this
is described in Section 4. We discuss related work in Sec-
tion 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2. FSX10: a secure parallel calculus
In this section, we introduce the calculus FSX10, based
on Featherweight X10 [22]. Like Featherweight X10, this
calculus captures X10’s async-ﬁnish parallelism, but adds
places and interaction with the external environment via
input and output instructions.
2.1 Syntax
The abstract syntax of FSX10 is presented in Figure 1. A
place P is a container for data and activities. In FSX10, as
in X10, every memory location r and every activity is asso-
ciated with a place. In FSX10, however, places are simply
identiﬁers and are not ﬁrst-class values. Function Place()
describes how memory locations are mapped to places:
memory location r is held at place Place(r), and only code
executing at that place is allowed to access the location.
For simplicity, we restrict values in the calculus to inte-
gers. Expressions e consist of integer constants v, variables
x, memory reads !r (where r is a memory location), and total
binary operations over expressions e1e2.
Statements s are sequences of instructions. Every instruc-
tion is labeled with a program point. For example, a store
instruction r :=p e has program point p. For convenience
we write sp to indicate that program point p is the program
point of the ﬁrst instruction of statement s. When the pro-
gram point of an instruction is irrelevant, we omit it.
Instructions include no-ops (skip), selection (if ethens
elses), and iteration (while edos). Instruction r := e eval-
uates expression e and updates memory location r with the
result. Instruction let x = eins evaluates expression e to a
value, and uses that value in place of variable x in the evalua-
tion of statement s. Once deﬁned, variable x is immutable. A
variable deﬁned at place P may be used at a different place
P0, which can be thought of as P sending the value of the
variable to P0.
Instruction async s creates a new activity that starts exe-
cuting statement s, and the current activity continues exe-
cuting the next instruction. Instruction at P s executes state-
ment s at place P. Note that at P s does not create a new
activity: execution of the next instruction waits until s has
terminated. That is, given the statement at P s;r := 42;skip,
the assignment of 42 to memory location r will not occur
until after statement s has ﬁnished execution. Instruction
backat Ps does not appear in source programs, but is used by
3Metavariables
P ranges over places
p ranges over program points
v ranges over integer constants
x ranges over program variables
r ranges over memory locations
 ranges over total binary integer functions
Expressions
e ::= v Integer constant
j x Variable
j !r Memory read
j ee Binary operation
Statements
s ::= skipp No-op
j i;s Sequence
Instructions
i ::= skipp No-op
j r :=p e Memory write
j ifp ethenselses Conditional
j whilep edos Iteration
j letp x = eins Let
j outputp e Output
j inputp r Input
j asyncp s Asynchronous
j atp P s At
j nishp s Finish
j backatp P Back at
Trees
T ::= hP;si Activity
j T jjT Parallel
j T . hP;si Join
j X Done
Figure 1. FSX10 syntax
the operational semantics to track when control will return
back to place P as a result of ﬁnishing an at P0 s0 instruc-
tion. Finally, instruction nish s will block until statement s,
and all activities created by s, have terminated.
FSX10 programs can communicate with the external en-
vironment via input and output instructions. We assume,
without loss of generality, that every place has a single com-
munication channel. Instruction output e, when executed at
placeP,willevaluateexpressionetoavalue,andoutputthat
value on P’s channel. Similarly, instruction input r, when
executed at P, will input a value from P’s channel, and store
the result in location r. We assume that there is always data
available for input on a channel, and thus input instructions
are non-blocking.
Concurrently executing activities in FSX10 are repre-
sented using trees. Tree hP;si is an activity at place P exe-
cuting statement s. Tree T1 jjT2 represents trees T1 and T2
executing concurrently. Tree X indicates a terminated activ-
ity, and tree T .hP;si indicates that activity hP;si is blocked
until all activities in T have terminated.
2.2 Events, traces, and input strategies
As a program executes, it generates input and output events.
Input event i(v;P) is generated when an input instruction
accepts value v from P’s channel. Output event o(v;P) is
generated when an output instruction outputs value v on P’s
channel.
A trace t is a (possibly empty) sequence of input, output
andlocation assignmentevents. Othereventsare nottracked.
We write  for the empty trace. We write tP for the subse-
quence of events of t that occur at place P. More formally,
we have
P = 
(t  )P =
(
(tP)   if Place() = P
tP otherwise
where function Place() is the place at which  occurred:
Place(i(v;P)) = P
Place(o(v;P)) = P:
We model input from the external environment with input
strategies[31]. Input strategy! is a function from placesand
traces to values, such that given trace t, value !(P;tP) is
the next value to input on the channel for P. Note that the
choice of the next value that will be input on a channel can
depend on the previous outputs of the channel. In Section 3,
where we consider the security of FSX10 programs, we will
be concerned with ensuring that low-security attackers are
unable to learn about the inputs to high-security places.
2.3 Scheduling
Since program execution, and information security, depends
on scheduling, we model the scheduler in FSX10. We explic-
itly reﬁne the nondeterminism inherent in scheduling using
reﬁners [31] to represent the decisions made by the sched-
uler. Essentially, all nondeterminism in program execution
is encapsulated in a reﬁner; once a reﬁner has been chosen,
program execution is deterministic.
In X10, a place represents a distinct computational node
withadistinctscheduler[14].Inaccordancewiththismodel,
we assume that scheduling decisions are made on a per-place
basis, and the choice of which activity to run at a given place
depends only on the set of activities currently executing at
that place.
4PLACE
Sch(P) = chs  ch PointsRunning(T;P) 6= ;
ch(PointsRunning(T;P)) = p (H; !; t; T)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T
0)
(H;!;(P  Ps;Sch);t;T) ! (H
0;!;(Ps;Sch[P ! chs]);t
0;T
0)
IDLEPLACE
PointsRunning(T;P) = ;
(H;!;(P  Ps;Sch);t;T) ! (H;!;(Ps;Sch);t;T)
PointsRunning(X;P) = ;
PointsRunning(hP
0;s
pi;P) =
(
fpg if P
0 = P
; if P
0 6= P
PointsRunning(T1 jjT2;P) = PointsRunning(T1;P) [ PointsRunning(T2;P)
PointsRunning(T . hP
0;si;P) = PointsRunning(T;P)
Figure 2. Program semantics (H;!;R;t;T) ! (H0;!;R0;t0;T0)
We model these assumptions by representing a reﬁner
R as a pair (Ps;Sch), where Ps is a stream of places
indicating the order in which places take steps, and Sch is a
function from places to streams chs of scheduling functions.
A scheduling function ch takes a set of program points
(representing the set of activities currently executing at the
place), and returns an element of that set (representing which
of the activities should be scheduled). We write P  Ps for a
stream with ﬁrst element P and remaining elements Ps.
Thus, if the reﬁner is (PPs;Sch), then place P will take
a step next, and if Sch(P) = ch  chs (where ch is the ﬁrst
element of the stream of scheduling function, and chs is the
remainder of the stream), then scheduling function ch will
be used to determine which of the current activities at P will
be scheduled. Note that each time a place takes a step, it may
use a different scheduling function. However, the sequence
of scheduling functions at a given place must be decided in
advance, and may not depend on the history of computation
at the place.
The use of a stream of scheduling functions per place al-
lows our model to capture many realistic scheduling algo-
rithms, such as round robin, shortest remaining time, and
ﬁxed priority. Scheduling algorithms that depend on the his-
tory of computation at a place (such as the work-stealing
scheduling algorithm used in the X10 runtime [14, 15]) can-
not be directly represented in this model. However, we be-
lieve the security guarantees still hold for the X10 runtime;
we further discuss the security of the X10 scheduler in Sec-
tion 4.
2.4 Operational semantics
A program conﬁguration is a 5-tuple (H;!;R;t;T). Heap
H maps locations r to values, and is updated as the program
executes. Input strategy ! is used to determine values in-
put on channels; the input strategy does not change during
execution, but we include it in the program conﬁguration
for notational convenience. Reﬁner R is used to determine
scheduling, and is updated during execution. Trace t is the
trace (of input, output, and location assignment events) pro-
duced so far by the program’s execution. Tree T is the tree
of currently executing activities.
The small-step operational semantics relation
(H;!;R;t;T) ! (H0;!;R0;t0;T0)
describes how a program conﬁguration changes as a result
of execution. Due to the use of reﬁners, the operational
semantics is deterministic. Inference rules for this relation
are given in Figure 2.
Rule PLACE uses the reﬁner to select a place P to exe-
cute, and to select a scheduling function ch to schedule an
activity at P. Set PointsRunning(T;P) is the set of program
points of running activities located at P (also deﬁned in Fig-
ure 2), which is given to scheduling function ch to select
an activity. Rule IDLEPLACE handles the case where the re-
ﬁner has selected place P to execute, but P does not have
any currently running activities. Judgment
(H; !; t; T)
p
_ (H0; !; t0; T0)
is used to indicate that tree conﬁguration (H; !; t; T) exe-
cutes the instruction at program point p to produce tree con-
ﬁguration (H0; !; t0; T0). Tree conﬁgurations are similar to
program conﬁgurations, but omit the reﬁner, since the reﬁner
is used only to determine which activity to execute.
Inference rules for (H; !; t; T)
p
_ (H0; !; t0; T0) are
given in Figure 3. Rules PARALEFT, PARARIGHT, PAR-
ALEFTDONE, PARARIGHTDONE, JOIN, and JOINDONE
navigate through the tree structure to ﬁnd the appropriate
activity to execute. Rule SKIP1 reduces a skip statement to a
terminated activity X. The remaining rules execute a single
instruction.
Several of the rules for evaluating instructions evaluate
expressions to values, using judgment P;H;e + v, which
is deﬁned in Figure 4. Evaluation of expressions is standard,
with the exception of memory read !r, which requires that
memory location r is held at place P, the current place of
the activity performing the read.
5PARALEFT
(H; !; t; T1)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T
0
1) T
0
1 6= X
(H; !; t; T1 jjT2)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T
0
1 jjT2)
PARARIGHT
(H; !; t; T2)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T
0
2) T
0
2 6= X
(H; !; t; T1 jjT2)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T1 jjT
0
2)
PARALEFTDONE
(H; !; t; T1)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; X)
(H; !; t; T1 jjT2)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T2)
PARARIGHTDONE
(H; !; t; T2)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; X)
(H; !; t; T1 jjT2)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T1)
JOIN
(H; !; t; T)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T
0) T
0 6= X
(H; !; t; T . hP;si)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; T
0 . hP;si)
JOINDONE
(H; !; t; T)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; X)
(H; !; t; T . hP;si)
p
_ (H
0; !; t
0; hP;si)
SKIP1
(H; !; t; hP;skip
pi)
p
_ (H; !; t; X)
SKIP2
(H; !; t; hP;skip
p;si)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP;si)
WRITE
P;H;e + v Place(r) = P
(H; !; t; hP;r :=
p e;si)
p
_ (H[r 7! v]; !; t; hP;si)
LET
P;H;e + v s
0
1 = s1fv=xg
(H; !; t; hP;let
p x = eins1;s2i)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP;s
0
1s2i)
ASYNC
(H; !; t; hP;async
p s1;s2i)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP;s1ijjhP;s2i)
FINISH
(H; !; t; hP;nish
p s1;s2i)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP;s1i . hP;s2i)
AT
(H; !; t; hP1;at
p P2 s1;s2i)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP2;s1(backat P1;s2)i)
BACKAT
(H; !; t; hP2;backat
p P1;si)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP1;si)
OUTPUT
P;H;e + v
(H; !; t; hP;output
p e;si)
p
_ (H; !; t  o(v;P); hP;si)
INPUT
Place(r) = P !(P;tP) = v
(H; !; t; hP;input
p r;si)
p
_ (H[r 7! v]; !; t  i(v;P); hP;si)
IF1
P;H;e + v v 6= 0
(H; !; t; hP;if
p ethens1 elses2;s3i)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP;s1s3i)
IF2
P;H;e + v v = 0
(H; !; t; hP;if
p ethens1 elses2;s3i)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP;s2s3i)
WHILE
(H; !; t; hP;(while
p edos1);s2i)
p
_ (H; !; t; hP;(if ethen(s1while edos1;skip)elseskip);s2i)
Figure 3. Tree and statement semantics (H; !; t; T)
p
_ (H0; !; t0; T0)
6CONST
P;H;v + v
READ
H(r) = v Place(r) = P
P;H;!r + v
OP
P;H;e1 + v1 P;H;e2 + v2
P;H;e1e2 + v1v2
Figure 4. Expression semantics P;H;e + v
Rule SKIP2 handles the instruction skip—it is a no-op.
Rule WRITE executes write instruction r :=p e by evaluat-
ing expression e to a value v and updating the heap to map
location r to v. Note that location r must be stored at the
place at which the activity is executing: Place(r) = P.
Rule LET executes let instruction let x = eins by eval-
uating expression e to value v, and substituting uses of
variable x in s with v using capture-avoiding substitution
sfv=xg. The rule uses the operation  to “stitch together”
two statements into a single statement. This operation is de-
ﬁned recursively as follows.
(i;s1)s2 = i;(s1s2)
skips2 = s2
Instruction async s1 creates a new activity to execute s1,
and the current activity continues with the next statement.
Thus, rule ASYNC executes the activity hP;async s1;s2i by
reducing it to the tree hP;s1ijjhP;s2i.
Statement nish s1;s2 executes s1, and waits until all
activities spawned by s1 have terminated before executing
s2. Rule FINISH transforms activity hP;nish s1;s2i to the
tree hP;s1i . hP;s2i.
Statement at P s1;s2 executes statement s1 at place P,
and then executes s2 at the original place. Rule AT thus
transforms activity hP0;at P s1;s2i to an activity at place P:
hP;s1(backat P0;s2)i. We insert the instruction backat P0
to let us know both that execution of s2 will be at place P0,
and that the movement of the activity to P0 is the result of
returning from a previous at instruction. Rule BACKAT for
statement backat P0 simply changes the place of the activity
back to place P0.
Rule OUTPUT evaluates output instruction output e by
evaluating e to value v, and appending event o(v;P) to the
program’s trace, where P is the current place of the activ-
ity. Similarly, rule INPUT evaluates input instruction input r
by inputting value v from P’s communication channel, up-
dating the heap to map location r to v, and appending event
i(v;P) to the program’s trace. The value to input is deter-
mined by input strategy !, and is equal to !(P;tP), where
P is thecurrent place ofthe activity, andtP is theprogram’s
trace so far restricted to events occurring at place P.
Rules IF1 and IF2 handle the conditional instruction
if ethens1 elses2 by reducing it to s1 if e evaluates to a non-
zero value, and reducing it to s2 otherwise. Rule WHILE
handles a while edos1 instruction by unrolling it into a con-
ditional instruction.
2.5 Program execution
A program is an activity hP;si, that is, a statement s that
is intended to start execution at place P. Program execution
depends on an input strategy ! and a reﬁner R. The initial
conﬁguration of a program is (Hinit;!;R;;hP;si), where
Hinit is a distinguished heap and  is the empty trace.
For program hP;si, input strategy !, and reﬁner R, we
write
(hP;si;!;R) emits t
to indicate that program execution can produce trace t. That
is, there is some heap H0, reﬁner R0 and tree T0 such that
(Hinit;!;R;;hP;si) ! (H0;!;R0;t;T0)
where ! is the reﬂexive transitive closure of the small-step
relation !.
3. Security
We are interested in enforcing strong information security
in concurrent programs. Towards that end, in this section,
we deﬁne a noninterference-based [12] deﬁnition of security
for FSX10, and present a type system that enforces security
whileallowingmanyusefulandhighlyconcurrentprograms.
3.1 Deﬁning security
Intuitively, we want to ensure that a consumer of low-
security information from a FSX10 program does not learn
anything about high-security information. In our setting,
consumers of low-security information are entities that can
observe the communication channel of low-security places,
and the high-security information that needs to be protected
are the values input at high-security places.
We assume that there is a set of security levels L with
a partial order v that describes relative restrictiveness of
the security levels. We further assume that every place P is
associated with a security level, denoted L(P). Intuitively,
place P will be allowed to store and handle only data of
security level L(P) and lower, and to send values to, and
invoke code on, only places P0 such that L(P) v L(P0).
For a given security level ` 2 L, a low-security place
is any place P such that the level of the place is less than
or equal to `, that is, L(P) v `. All other places are high-
security places, i.e., P is a high-security place if L(P) 6v `.
We deﬁne a semantic security condition based on at-
tacker knowledge [2]. An attacker observes the communi-
cation channels of low-security places. The knowledge of an
attacker is the set of input strategies that are consistent with
the attacker’s observations: the smaller the set, the more ac-
curate the attacker’s knowledge. The semantic security con-
dition will require that at all times, the attacker’s knowledge
includesallpossibleinputstrategiesforhigh-securityplaces.
7That is, all possible input strategies for high-security places
are consistent with the attacker’s observations. For ease of
presentation, we will use a slightly weaker semantic secu-
rity condition, a progress-insensitive condition [3] that also
allows the attacker to learn not only the input strategies for
low security places, but also whether low-security output is
produced.
Trace equivalence Given an attacker with security level
` 2 L (i.e., who can observe communication channels of
places P such that L(P) v `), two executions of a program
lookthesametotheattackerifthetraceofinputsandoutputs
at low-security places are the same in both executions. We
deﬁne this formally via `-equivalence of traces.
Deﬁnition 1 (`-equivalence of traces). Let ` 2 L. Traces
t0 and t1 are `-equivalent, written t0 ` t1, if t0` = t1`,
where
` = 
(t  )` =
(
(t`)   if L(Place()) v `
t` otherwise
Attacker knowledge For a given execution of a program,
starting from program conﬁguration (Hinit;!;R;;hP;si),
that produces trace t, the knowledge of an attacker with
security level `, written k(hP;si;R;t;`), is the set of input
strategies that could have produced a trace that is equivalent
to what the attacker observed.
Deﬁnition 2 (Attacker knowledge). For any ` 2 L, program
hP;si, trace t, and reﬁner R, the attacker’s knowledge is:
k(hP;si;R;t;`) =
f! j 9t0: (hP;si;!;R) emits t0 ^ t ` t0g
We deﬁne what information an attacker with security
level ` is permitted to learn about input strategies by deﬁning
`-equivalence of input strategies. Intuitively, if two strategies
are `-equivalent, then they provide the exact same inputs for
all low-security places, and an attacker with security level `
should not be able to distinguish them.
Deﬁnition 3 (`-equivalence of input strategies). Let ` 2 L.
Input strategies !0 and !1 are `-equivalent, written !0 `
!1, if for all places P such that L(P) v `, and for all traces
t, we have !0(P;tP) = !1(P;tP).
Relation ` is an equivalence relation, and we write [!]`
for the equivalence class of ! under the relation `.
Given a program conﬁguration (Hinit;!;R;;hP;si)
that produces trace t, progress knowledge [3] is the set of
input strategies that could have produced a trace that is `-
equivalent to t, and could produce at least one more ob-
servable event. We will use progress knowledge as a lower
bound on the allowed knowledge of an attacker. That is, we
will explicitly allow the attacker to learn whether a program
will produce another observable event. This means that the
attacker may be permitted to learn the termination behavior
of statements that depend on high-security information.
Deﬁnition 4 (Progress knowledge). For any ` 2 L, program
hP;si, trace t, and reﬁner R, progress knowledge is:
k+(hP;si;R;t;`) =
f! j 9t0;: (hP;si;!;R) emits (t0  )
^ t ` t0 ^ L(Place()) v `g
Our security condition requires that, for all attackers, and
all executions, for each event the attacker can observe, the
attacker learns no more than the input strategy for low-
securityplaces,andthefactthatanothereventwasproduced.
Deﬁnition 5 (Security). Program hP;si is secure if for all
` 2 L, traces t  , reﬁners R, and input strategies ! such
that
(hP;si;!;R) emits (t  )
we have
k(hP;si;R;t  ;`)  [!]` \ k+(hP;si;R;t;`):
Recall that the attacker’s knowledge is set of input strate-
gies that are consistent with the attacker’s observations: a
smallersetmeansmorepreciseknowledge.Securityrequires
that there are lower bounds to the precision of the attacker’s
knowledge. That is, there is information that the attacker is
not permitted to learn. Thus, security requires that attacker’s
knowledge is a superset of the knowledge it is permitted to
learn.
According to this deﬁnition of security, Program 2 from
the Introduction is insecure (assuming that memory location
hi is initialized from an input from place High), since there
exists a reﬁner and a strategy that will produce a trace that
allows an observer of low-security outputs to learn some-
thing about the high-security input strategy. Indeed, our def-
inition of security rules out internal timing channels [48],
in which the order of low-security events (here, input, out-
put, and accesses to memory locations) depends upon high-
security information. Program 3 does not exhibit an internal
timing channel, and is secure.
This deﬁnition of security is progress insensitive [3], as it
permits the attacker to learn that program execution makes
progress, and produces another observable output. This def-
inition can be strengthened in a straightforward way to a
progress sensitive security condition. While the type sys-
tem of Section 3.2 enforces progress insensitive security, it
can be modiﬁed using standard techniques (to conservatively
reason about termination of loops) to enforce progress sen-
sitive security [28]. We refrain from doing so to simplify the
presentation of the type system.
83.2 Enforcing security
We enforce security using a security type system. The type
system ensures that each place P stores and handles only
data input from places P0 such that L(P0) v L(P). How-
ever, as noted in the Introduction, it is possible for the
scheduling of activities at place P to be inﬂuenced by in-
put from a place P0 such that L(P0) 6v L(P). Our type
system tracks and controls information ﬂow through this
covert channel through program point contexts.
A program point context  is a function from program
points to security levels such that (p) is an upper bound on
the level of information that may inﬂuence the scheduling
of program point p. More precisely, it is an upper bound
on information that may affect the presence or absence of
activities that may run concurrently with p at the same place.
Each program point is statically associated with a place,
and we write Place(p) for the place at which program point
p will execute. Intuitively, since program point p is executed
at place Place(p), and Place(p) handles data at security
level L(Place(p)), we would expect that (p) is at least as
restrictive as L(Place(p)). Indeed, the type system ensures
for all p that L(Place(p)) v (p).
It is often the case that L(Place(p)) is also an upper
bound of (p). That is, the scheduling of p does not de-
pend on any high-security information. However, if p may
happen immediately after a computation at a high-security
place ﬁnishes (as with the output "pos" instruction in Pro-
gram 2), or in parallel with another program point at the
same place whose scheduling depends on high-security in-
formation, then it is possible that (p) 6v L(Place(p)). In
that case, in order to ensure that the scheduling decision at
place Place(p) does not leak high-security information, we
require observational determinism [49] at Place(p) during
the scheduling of p. That is, for each memory location stored
at Place(p), there are no data races on that location, and the
order of input and output at Place(p) is determined.
Finally, variable context   maps program variables to the
place at which the variable was created. The type system
uses the variable context to ensure that if variable x was
declared at place P, then x is used only at places P0 such
that L(P) v L(P0).
May-happen-in-parallel analysis The type system relies
on the results of a may-happen-in-parallel analysis, such
as the one presented by Lee and Palsberg for Feather-
weight X10 [22]. The async-ﬁnish parallelism of X10 is
amenable to a precise may-happen-in-parallel analysis. We
write MHPP(p) for the set of program points that may hap-
pen in parallel with program point p at the same place (i.e.,
at Place(p)).
Typing expressions Judgment p; ; ` e indicates that
expression e, occurring at program point p is well typed un-
der variable context   and program point context . Infer-
ence rules for this judgment are given in Figure 5. Constants
noWrite(r;p) = 8p0 2 MHPP(p): instruction at
p0 does not write to r
noReadWrite(r;p) = noWrite(r;p) ^
8p0 2 MHPP(p): instruction at
p0 does not read r.
noIO(p) = 8p0 2 MHPP(p): instruction at p0
does not perform input or output.
Figure 6. Predicate deﬁnitions
v are always well typed, and the use of variable x is well
typed if the level of the place at which x is deﬁned (L( (x)))
is less than or equal to the level of the place at which x is
used (L(Place(p))). Expression e1e2 is well typed if both
e1 and e2 are well typed.
There are two different rules for reading memory loca-
tion r. The ﬁrst rule, rule T-READNONDET, handles the
case where the scheduling of the expression’s execution at
place Place(p) is inﬂuenced by information at most at level
L(Place(p)). In that case, there are no restrictions on when
the read may occur: it may occur concurrently with activities
at the same place that write to the location since the resolu-
tion of the data race will not be a covert information channel.
(The existence of a data race may, however, be undesirable
in terms of program functionality.)
The second rule, rule T-READDET, applies when the
scheduling of the expression may be inﬂuenced by informa-
tion that is not allowed to ﬂow to level L(Place(p)). In that
case, the read is required to be observationally deterministic:
predicate noWrite(r;p) must hold, implying that the read of
memory location r at program point p must not execute con-
currently with any statement that may write to r. Predicate
noWrite(r;p) is deﬁned in Figure 6.
Typing statements Judgment  ; ` s : ` indicates that
statement s is well typed in variable context   and program
point context , and that security level ` is an upper bound
on the security level of information that may inﬂuence the
scheduling of the last program point of s. Inference rules for
the judgment are given in Figure 7.
Every inference rule for a statement sp includes the
premise 8p0 2 MHPA(p): (p0) v (p). Intuitively, the
set MHPA(p) is the set of program points that may inﬂu-
ence the presence or absence of activities running in parallel
with p at the same place. Assuming that Place(p) = P,
MHPA(p) contains the program points of backat P instruc-
tions that may happen in parallel with p, and the set of pro-
gram points immediately following an atp
0
P0 s0 instruction,
where Place(p0) = P and p0 may happen in parallel with
p. The set MHPA(p) is a subset of the program points that
may happen in parallel with p, and can easily be computed
from the results of a may-happen-in-parallel analysis. Given
this deﬁnition, the premise above requires that (p), the up-
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p; ; ` v
T-VAR
L( (x)) v L(Place(p))
p; ; ` x
T-OP
p; ; ` e1
p; ; ` e2
p; ; ` e1e2
T-READNONDET
(p) v L(Place(p))
p; ; `!r
T-READDET
(p) 6v L(Place(p))
noWrite(r;p)
p; ; `!r
Figure 5. Expression typing judgment p; ; ` e
T-SKIP1
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` skip
p : (p)
T-SKIP2
 ; ` s : ` (p) v (p1)
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` skip
p;s
p1 : `
T-LET
p; ; ` e  [x 7! Place(p)]; ` s1 : `1
 ; ` s2 : `2 (p) v (p1) `1 v (p2)
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` let
p x = eins
p1
1 ;s
p2
2 : `2
T-ASYNC
 ; ` s1 : `1  ; ` s2 : `2 (p) v (p1)
(p) v (p2) 8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` async
p s
p1
1 ;s
p2
2 : `2
T-FINISH
 ; ` s1 : `1  ; ` s2 : `2 (p) v (p1) L(Place(p2)) v (p2)
8p
0 2 MHPP(p): (p
0) v (p2) 8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` nish
p s
p1
1 ;s
p2
2 : `2
T-AT
 ; ` s1 : `1  ; ` s2 : `2 (p) v L(P)
L(P) v (p1) `1 v (p2) 8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` at
p P s
p1
1 ;s
p2
2 : `2
T-BACKAT
 ; ` s : ` (p) v (p1)
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` backat
p P;s
p1 : `
T-WRITENONDET
(p) v L(Place(p))
 ; ` s : ` p; ; ` e (p) v (p1)
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` r :=
p e;s
p1 : `
T-WRITEDET
(p) 6v L(Place(p)) noReadWrite(r;p)
 ; ` s : ` p; ; ` e (p) v (p1)
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` r :=
p e;s
p1 : `
T-OUTPUTNONDET
(p) v L(Place(p))
 ; ` s : ` p; ; ` e (p) v (p1)
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` output
p e;s
p1 : `
T-OUTPUTDET
(p) 6v L(Place(p)) noIO(p)
 ; ` s : ` p; ; ` e (p) v (p1)
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` output
p e;s
p1 : `
T-INPUTNONDET
(p) v L(Place(p))  ; ` s : `
(p) v (p1) 8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` input
p r;s
p1 : `
T-INPUTDET
(p) 6v L(Place(p)) noReadWrite(r;p) noIO(p)
 ; ` s : ` (p) v (p1) 8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` input
p r;s
p1 : `
T-IF
 ; ` s1 : `1  ; ` s2 : `2  ; ` s3 : `3
p; ; ` e (p) v (p1) (p) v (p2)
`1 v (p3) `2 v (p3) 8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` if
p ethens
p1
1 elses
p2
2 ;s
p3
3 : `3
T-WHILE
 ; ` s1 : `1  ; ` s2 : `2 p1; ; ` e
(p) v (p1) `1 v (p) `1 v (p2)
8p
0 2 MHPA(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` while
p edos
p1
1 ;s
p2
2 : `2
Figure 7. Statement typing judgment  ; ` s : `
10per bound on the scheduling of s, is at least as restrictive as
the scheduling of any program point that may inﬂuence the
presence or absence of activities running in parallel with p
at the same place.
Also, almost all inference rules for statements ensure that
if program point p executes after p0 (for example, because
they are in sequence), then (p0) v (p). The intuition
here is that if information at level (p0) may inﬂuence the
scheduling of p0, and p follows in sequence after p0, then
information at level (p0) may inﬂuence the scheduling of
p. For example, the typing rule for ifp ethens
p1
1 elses
p2
2 ;s
p3
3
requires that (p) v (p1) and (p) v (p2), since the
execution of s1 and s2 will occur only after the evaluation
of the conditional guard. Similarly, since the execution of s3
will follow the execution of either s1 or s2, the rule requires
that `1 v (p3) and `2 v (p3), where `1 and `2 are upper
bounds of the scheduling of the last program points of s1 and
s2 respectively.
We discuss only the inference rules that have premises in
addition to those common to all rules.
Statement letp x = eins
p1
1 ;s
p2
2 declares a variable x, and
allows x to be used in the scope of statement s1. Rule T-LET
thus allows s1 to be typed with a variable context that maps
variable x to the place at which it was deﬁned: Place(p).
Statement nishp s
p1
1 ;s
p2
2 executes statement s1, and
waits until all activities spawned by s1 have ﬁnished before
executing s2. Rule T-FINISH requires that (p) v (p1)
(since p1 is executed after p) but notably does not require
either (p) v (p2) or `1 v (p2), despite the fact that p2
is executed after p and p1. The intuition is that because the
scheduling behavior at place P = Place(p) depends only
on the current activities at P, by the time that p2 is sched-
uled, program points p and p1 (and all activities spawned
by s1) have ﬁnished execution, and do not inﬂuence the
scheduling of p2. In Program 3 in the Introduction, this rea-
soning is what permits us to conclude that the scheduling of
output ``B'' and output ``C'' do not depend on high-security
computation.
1 at Low f
2 async f
3 // Activity 1
4 mediumComputation(); output ``nonpos'';
5 g
6 nish f
7 // Activity 2
8 at High f
9 if (hi > 0) longComputation();
10 g
11 g
12 // Activity 3
13 output ``pos'';
14 g
Program 4.
However, it may be possible that scheduling of activi-
ties spawned by s1 indirectly inﬂuences the scheduling of
p2. Consider Program 4, which contains a nish s1;s2 state-
ment where s2 = output ``pos'', and s1 invokes compu-
tation at high-security place High. There is an additional
activity that executes concurrently with the nish statement:
mediumComputation(); output ``nonpos''. The scheduling of
this activity relative to s2 will depend on the high-security
computation. Indeed, this program is equivalent to Pro-
gram 2, and both are insecure. Thus, typing rule T-FINISH
requires that (p2) is at least as restrictive as (p0) for any
program point p0 that may execute in parallel with p at the
same place. This ensures that insecure Program 4, and others
like it, are rejected by the type system.
Statement atp P s
p1
1 ;s
p2
2 executes s1 at place P, and then
executes s2 back at place Place(p). Rule T-AT requires that
the upper bound on the scheduling of the at instruction is
permitted to ﬂow to the level of place P ((p) v L(P)).
Thus the type system restricts the creation of an activity at
place P to reveal only information that is allowed to ﬂow to
levelL(P).Also,becausestatements
p1
1 isexecutingatplace
P, information at level L(P) will inﬂuence the scheduling
of p1: L(P) v (p1). Finally, because statement s
p2
2 is
executedonlyafters1,theschedulingofp2 dependsonwhen
the last statement of s1 is scheduled: `1 v (p2) where `1 is
an upper bound on the scheduling of the last program point
of s1.
Similar to the typing rules for reading memory loca-
tions, there are two rules for writing memory locations: T-
WRITENONDET and T-WRITEDET. As with the rules for
reading memory, the ﬁrst is for the case where the schedul-
ing of the write is not inﬂuenced by high-security informa-
tion, and there are thus no restrictions on when the write
may occur. Rule T-WRITEDET applies when the schedul-
ing of the write may be inﬂuenced by high-security informa-
tion, and requires observational determinism via the predi-
cate noReadWrite(r;p), deﬁned in Figure 6, which ensures
that no reads or writes to the same memory location may
happen in parallel.
The rules for input and output are similar to the rules for
reading and writing memory locations: if the scheduling of
input or output may depend on high-security information,
the input or output must be observationally deterministic,
which is achieved for output by requiring that there is no
other input or output at that place that may happen in parallel
(see predicate noIO(p), deﬁned in Figure 6). Since an input
instruction writes to a memory location r, rule T-INPUTDET
requires both that no input or output may happen at the place
in parallel, and that no reads or writes to r may happen in
parallel.
Typing trees Judgment  ; ` T means that tree T is
well typed in variable context   and program point context
. Inference rules for the judgment are given in Figure 8.
The rules require that all activities in the tree are well typed.
11T-ACTIVITY
 ; ` s : ` L(P) v (p)
 ; ` hP;s
pi
T-PARA
 ; ` T1  ; ` T2
 ; ` T1kT2
T-JOIN
 ; ` T  ; ` hP;s
pi
8p
0 2 MHPP(p): (p
0) v (p)
 ; ` T . hP;s
pi
T-DONE
 ; ` X
Figure 8. Tree typing judgment  ; ` T
Also, the rule for tree T .hP;spi, T-JOIN, requires that (p)
is at least as restrictive as (p0) for any program point p0 that
may execute in parallel with p at place P, for similar reasons
to the typing rule for nish statements, T-FINISH.
Soundness of type system The type system enforces secu-
rity. That is, if a program is well typed, then it is secure.
Theorem 1. If hP;si is a program such that  ; ` hP;si
for some variable context   and program point context ,
then hP;si is secure according to Deﬁnition 5.
We present a brief sketch of the proof here. A more de-
tailed proof appears in the companion technical report [29].
Outline of Proof. The proof uses a technique similar to that
of Terauchi [45]. We ﬁrst introduce the concept of an erased
conﬁguration. A conﬁguration m erases to a conﬁguration
m0 at security level ` if m0, when executed, performs no
computation at places with security level higher than ` but
m and m0 otherwise agree. Erased programs are deﬁned
similarly, with erased conﬁgurations containing erased pro-
grams.
Suppose we have a well-typed program hP;si, some se-
curity level `, and two `-equivalent input strategies !1 and
!2. First, we erase the program hP;si to program hP;s0i
at level ` and consider side-by-side executions of these two
programs with the same input strategy. Suppose the original
program with input strategy !1 produces trace t1. Then the
erased program with input strategy !1 can produce a trace t0
1
that is `-equivalent. Similarly, if the original program with
input strategy !2 produces trace t2, then the erased pro-
gram with input strategy !2 can produce a trace t0
2 that is
`-equivalent.
Second,weconsidertheexecutionsoftheerasedprogram
with strategy !1 and strategy !2 that produced traces t0
1
and t0
2 respectively. Since the erased program performs no
computation at high-security places, either t0
1 is a preﬁx of
t0
2, or vice versa. Combining this with the previous result,
if (hP;si;!1;R) emits t1 and (hP;si;!2;R) emits t2, then
either the low-security events of t1 are a preﬁx of the low-
security events of t2, or vice versa.
Knowledge-based security can then be shown as follows.
Let ! be an input strategy, R a reﬁner, and ` a security level.
Suppose that (hP;si;!;R) emits t  . Let !0 be another
input strategy such that ! ` !0 and (hP;si;!0;R) emits t0
0 such that t ` t0 and L(Place(0)) v `. The above
result implies that either  = 0 or L(Place()) 6v `. In
either case, t   ` t0  0, and so the inclusion required by
Deﬁnition 5 is proven.
4. SX10 prototype implementation
We have extended the principles of the security analysis of
Section 3 to handle many of the language features of X10.
The resulting language, called SX10, is a subset of X10. We
have implemented a prototype compiler for SX10 by extend-
ing the open-source X10 compiler (version 2.1.2), which is
implemented using the Polyglot extensible compiler frame-
work[30],andisincludedintheX10distribution.Ourexten-
sion comprises approximately 8,500 lines of non-comment
non-blank lines of Java code.
We do not modify the X10 run-time system: SX10 pro-
grams run using the standard X10 run-time system. We thus
do not provide a performance comparison of SX10 with X10
orwithothersecureconcurrentsystems.Suchaperformance
comparison is not directly useful, as it would evaluate the ef-
ﬁciency of the X10 runtime, not our enforcement technique,
which is entirely static.
In this section, we describe how we extend the analysis to
handle additional language features of X10 and present some
example SX10 programs.
May-happen-in-parallel analysis We have implemented
the may-happen-in-parallel (MHP) analysis of Lee and Pals-
berg [22] for SX10, which is a straightforward exercise.
However, for additional precision in our security analysis,
we implemented a place-sensitive MHP analysis. In our cal-
culus FSX10, for every program point it is possible to stat-
ically determine which place the program point would ex-
ecute on. In SX10, however, code for a given class may be
executed at more than one place, since objects of the same
class may reside at different places. Thus, if an activity at
place P is executing code from program point p, our place-
sensitive MHP analysis conservatively approximates the set
MHP(p;P) such that if (p0;P0) 2 MHP(p;P) then an ac-
tivity at place P0 may concurrently be executing code from
program point p0.
Places We assume that all places are statically known,
and that a security level is associated with each place. A
conﬁguration ﬁle speciﬁes the set of security levels L, the
ordering v over the levels, and maps places to levels. Our
prototype implementation does not currently support ﬁrst-
class places. If places are computed dynamically, then the
choice of the place at which to execute a computation could
be a covert channel, and would thus require the security
analysis to track and control information ﬂow through this
channel. In this respect, ﬁrst-class places are similar to ﬁrst-
class security levels (e.g., [13, 50]), and the security analysis
could be extended to handle ﬁrst-class places using similar
techniques, such as dependent type systems.
12As in FSX10, we restrict at statements to allow place P
to invoke code on place P0 only if L(P) v L(P0).
In addition to at statements, X10 has at expressions:
at P e evaluates expression e at place P. We allow at
expressions, but only from place P to place P0 where
L(P) = L(P0). If the security level of the places differed,
then either data would be sent from a high-security place
to a low-security place, or a high-security place would in-
voke code on a low-security place. Either way, a potentially
dangerous information ﬂow occurs, and must be ruled out.
Concurrency mechanisms The X10 async and nish state-
ments are restricted similarly to their counterparts in FSX10.
X10 provides additional synchronization mechanisms, in-
cluding clocks (a form of synchronization barrier), futures,
and atomic blocks. Our prototype implementation does not
currently support these additional mechanisms. However,
they can be incorporated in a straightforward manner by ex-
tending the MHP analysis to reason about them. Once the
MHP analysis supports these constructs, our security anal-
ysis can be extended to add constraints similar to those for
async and nish statements.
Objects Fields of objects can be mutable locations, and we
enforce restrictions similar to those of other memory loca-
tions: we require determinism on accesses when scheduling
may be inﬂuenced by high-security information. If an ob-
ject is sent in a message from one place to another, the X10
runtime will create a copy of the object, thus ensuring that
if an activity at a place attempts to update a ﬁeld of an ob-
ject, the memory location is local to the place. When objects
are copied to send to another place, we impose restrictions
similar to the use of variables: a copy of an object created at
place P may be sent to place P0 only if L(P) v L(P0).
Control-ﬂow constructs X10 has much richer control-
ﬂow constructs than the calculus FSX10. We support local-
control-ﬂow constructs, such as for loops and switch state-
ments. We support dynamic dispatch of methods, using class
information to conservatively over-approximate the set of
possible callees at a method call site. We do not currently
support exceptions, although they can be incorporated by
extending the MHP analysis. Note that exceptions interact
in an interesting way with the concurrency mechanisms, due
to X10’s rooted exception model [41].
Input and output The security analysis for SX10 restricts
input and output from the system to enforce strong informa-
tion security guarantees. We currently require methods that
perform communication with the external environment to be
explicitly annotated as such, but it is straightforward to infer
wheresuchmethodsareused,forexample,detectingmethod
calls to objects of classes x10.io.Printer, x10.io.Reader, etc.
(Fields x10.io.Console.OUT and x10.io.Console.IN are in-
stances of Printer and Reader, respectively.)
Arrays Our implementation supports local arrays, since
these are simply objects of the class x10.array.Array[T], and
elements of the array are stored at a single place. We do not
currently support distributed arrays, which store elements
over multiple places. Adding support for distributed arrays
would require support for ﬁrst-class places.
X10 runtime scheduler The X10 runtime scheduler uses a
work-stealing algorithm to scheduleactivities within a place.
This requires that threads maintain a double-ended queue
of pending activities, and idle threads may steal activities
from busy threads. Because the state of the queues may be
inﬂuenced by which activities were or were not running at
the place in the past, such work-stealing algorithms cannot
be represented in our scheduling model in FSX10, which
requires that scheduling functions do not depend on the
history of computation at a place.
The type system relies on this requirement only in the
rule for a nish s1;s2 statement, which allows the program
point context of the ﬁrst program point of s2 to be lower than
program point context of the last program point of s1 when
there are no other activities running at the place. However, in
that situation there are no other activities to schedule other
than s1 and activities spawned by s1: activity s2 will not
start execution until it is the only activity at the place. In
that case, the state of the work queues for threads will be
independent of the history of the computation up to that
point. Thus, we expect the security guarantee to transfer to
the actual scheduler used by the X10 runtime.
It is future work to extend the model of schedulers in
FSX10 to include such work-stealing schedulers.
Improvements to Analysis In implementing the SX10
compiler, we add an optimization that allows the type sys-
tem to be more permissive without compromising security.
If statement at P s is executed at place P0 and no statement
at P0 is dependent on the termination of s, then the schedul-
ing of activities at P0 is independent of when s terminates,
and we do not need to increase the program point context of
statements that may happen in parallel. This corresponds to
having a more precise deﬁnition of the set MHPA(p).
4.1 Example programs
Distributed Machine Learning Consider a music recom-
mendation service, such as Pandora. Here, a large database
of music information exists: the Music Genome Project.
The service would like to process this data—perhaps run-
ning machine-learning algorithms on it—and then combine
it with data from individual users to produce recommenda-
tions for users. We assume the database of music informa-
tion is public, but the personal data from users is secret, and
should not inﬂuence the results observed by other users.
We assume that the processing of the public data can be
performed in parallel. We will process this data at a number
of places pub0 through pubn, all with the same low security
level L. Results from the processing will be sent back to the
coordinator place, and collated into a value called results. We
use the results of the processing of public data to compute
13recommendations for each user. We assume that each user
Ui has its own place Pi, with a unique security level Hi such
that L v Hi.
AsketchofthecodeforthissystemappearsinProgram5.
Public data is supplied in the array pubData and we assume
that place Pi already holds the data for user Ui.
1 at coordinator f
2 nish f
3 async at pub0 f
4 val res = processPublicData(pubData(0));
5 at coordinator f addResult(res); g
6 g
7 ...
8 async at pubn f
9 val res = processPublicData(pubData(n));
10 at coordinator f addResult(res); g
11 g
12 g
13
14 async f at P0 f processPrivateData(results); g g
15 ...
16 async f at Pn f processPrivateData(results); g g
17 g
Program 5. A distributed machine learning system
Note that no additional synchronization is required to
make this program secure, and the secure program is in fact
allowed to be highly concurrent. The translation of this pro-
gram from X10 to SX10 does, however, require signiﬁcant
code duplication due to the lack of support for distributed
arrays and ﬁrst-class places. Natural X10 programming style
would use a loop over places to execute a block of code at
each place, rather than duplicate the code as we do here.
Online Shopping Following Tsai et al. [47], we consider
a server running a shopping website. We assume that the
server is concerned with keeping credit card data secure. Our
example program models a multithreaded server accepting
inputfromtwowebforms.Ontheﬁrstform,auserentersthe
item number they wish to purchase. This form is submitted
along with the user’s unique customer ID, which persists
through the user’s session. When this form is processed, the
user’s order is both saved on the server and output to a log
for inventory purposes. The user is then presented with the
next form, which requests his or her credit card number. This
form is submitted with the same customer ID, and the credit
card number is sent to an external service for processing.
This example contains two security levels. The customer
ID and order are considered low-security, and the log is con-
sideredlow-securityoutput.Thecustomer’screditcardnum-
ber is high-security, and so the action of exporting it should
occur at a high place. We would like to ensure that no data
from either the second form or the credit card processing
service can leak to the log. The code for handling one cus-
tomer’s purchase is shown in Program 6.
Simpson’s Rule Our ﬁnal example program demonstrates
that in programs, or sections of programs, in which all data
is at the same security level, our analysis requires very few
changes to the code for compilation. Thus, when a program
operates on homogenous data, our security analysis does not
signiﬁcantly impact usability. The code for this example was
takenfrom theSimpson’sRule exampleavailable ontheX10
website1. The original program consists of approximately
200 non-blank non-comment lines of X10 code. Converting
this program to SX10 required modifying seven lines of
code, most of them trivially, and adding ten. The changes
were as follows:
 Five statements producing console output were annotated
as required by SX10.
 The original program uses all available places. Since
SX10 requires static places, Place.MAX PLACES, which
in X10 is set to the number of places, was replaced with
a new (arbitrary) constant, set to four for the purposes
of this example. Identiﬁers representing these four places
were declared.
 The code to start computation at each place was dupli-
cated, since SX10 does not support loops over places.
This required ﬁve additional lines of code.
Note that neither the number of lines modiﬁed nor the num-
ber added necessarily scales with the size of the code. Most
required modiﬁcations were to input or output statements,
and the number of lines of code added was proportional to
the number of places used, not the size of the program.
Discussion of Example Programs The example programs
demonstrate that it is possible to write realistic, highly con-
current programs in SX10. Note that the ﬁrst two examples
containahighdegreeofnondeterminism.Theorderinwhich
blocks of data are processed in Program 5 and the order in
which entries are written to the log and credit card service in
Program 6 are nondeterministic. This is secure because the
resolution of this nondeterminism can in no way reveal high-
securityinformation.AswillbediscussedinSection5,some
previous security-type systems for noninterference in con-
current programs would rule out this nondeterminism and
require additional synchronization and overhead.
The third example demonstrates that our analysis does
not signiﬁcantly prohibit the compilation and execution of
programs that operate on a single security level.
The biggest restriction in SX10 is the lack of ﬁrst-class
places. As we gain more experience writing SX10 programs,
we will identify and address further challenges to practical
and secure concurrent programming.
5. Related work
This work seeks to provide strong language-based informa-
tionsecurityguaranteesforconcurrentprograms.Wediscuss
1http://x10-lang.org/
141 async f
2 at lowform f
3 val custID = Int.parse(Console.IN.readLine().trim());
4 // Input item number (low security)
5 items(custID) = Int.parse(Console.IN.readLine().trim());
6 at log Console.OUT.println(custID + "nt" + items(custID));
7 at highform f
8 // Input credit card number (high security)
9 val card = Int.parse(Console.IN.readLine().trim());
10 at cc Console.OUT.println(card + "nt" + costs(items(custID)));
11 g
12 g
13 g
Program 6. An online shopping cart
related work, focusing on recent work that controls informa-
tion ﬂow in concurrent settings.
Observational determinism Our security analysis ensures
that if the scheduling of input, output, or memory accesses
may leak sensitive information, then the order of such in-
structions must be deterministic. This approach is inspired
by Zdancewic and Myers [49], who propose (following
McLean [27] and Roscoe [33]) that there should be no non-
determinism (including thread scheduling) observable by a
low-security observer. They present a semantic security con-
dition that, for each observable memory location, requires
determinism of the sequence of updates to that location.
Huisman et al. [19] point out that this semantic security con-
dition may reveal more information than intended, and pro-
pose that the sequence of updates to all observable memory
locations should be deterministic. Terauchi [45] presents a
type system that enforces such a semantic security condition
in a shared-memory setting using fractional capabilities.
Mantel et al. [26] present semantic conditions that al-
low composition of concurrent programs. The semantic con-
ditions use assume-guarantee reasoning to ensure that the
composed program is free of data races, and thus is observa-
tionally deterministic.
Requiring observational determinism throughout a pro-
gram is, however, overly restrictive. O’Neill et al. [31] note
that low-observable nondeterminism is acceptable so long as
its resolution depends only on low-observable information.
Wethusallownondeterminismintheschedulingofactivities
at a place, provided that the resolution of the nondetermin-
ism cannot leak sensitive information. Our model assumes
that scheduling of activities at a place depends only on the
activities at that place, and our security analysis exploits this
assumption to allow non-determinism where possible.
Recent work on deterministic concurrency (e.g., [7, 46])
highlights functional beneﬁts of determinism, and also al-
lows some nondeterminism when it is safe to do so [8].
Scheduler independence Sabelfeld and Sands [38, 40] ar-
guethatthedeﬁnitionofsecurityinmulti-threadedprograms
should be scheduler independent, since the scheduler is typi-
cally outside of the language speciﬁcation, and violations of
scheduler assumptions may lead to vulnerabilities. By con-
trast, Boudol and Castellani [9] present a type system for
schedulers and threads, and show that well-typed schedulers
and threads satisfy a deﬁnition of security [4].
Barthe et al. [5] have developed a framework for security
of multi-threaded programs that allows programs to be writ-
ten without knowledge of the scheduler, i.e., in a scheduler-
independent manner. Mechanisms to interact with the sched-
uler and secure timing channels are introduced during com-
pilation, and enable a security-aware scheduler to enforce
strong information security guarantees.
Mantel and Sabelfeld [24] show a scheduler-independent
security property in a multi-threaded while language. Russo
and Sabelfeld [35] suggest a model in which threads may
increase and decrease their security levels and permit-
ted scheduling decisions depend on the security levels of
threads. Mantel and Sudbrock [25] prove a security property
for programs consisting of threads with assigned security
levels when these are run under any scheduler in a class of
robust schedulers. Robust schedulers, such as round-robin
schedulers, have the property that the probability that a par-
ticular low thread will be selected to run from among all
low threads remains the same if high threads are removed.
Our assumptions about scheduling in the X10 runtime im-
ply that schedulers for places are robust, in that scheduling
of activities at a place cannot depend upon the existence or
non-existence of activities at higher-security places.
We do not provide scheduler independence. Our type-
system and security proof assume that scheduling at a place
depends only on the activities currently executing at a place.
While this assumption enables greater concurrency while
preserving security, it perhaps violates an abstraction bound-
ary, as it makes assumptions about the behavior of the X10
runtime that are not necessarily intended as part of the run-
time’s speciﬁcation.
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Tsai et al. [47] extend work of Li and Zdancewic [23] and
Russo and Sabelfeld [34] to encode information-ﬂow con-
trol in Haskell with support for concurrency and side-effects.
However, their mechanism relies on co-operative (i.e., non-
preemptive) scheduling, which may not be suitable for mod-
ern operating systems.
Stefanetal.[44]presentadynamicinformation-ﬂowcon-
trol system that eliminates termination and internal timing
channels, and mitigates external timing channels, without re-
lying on co-operative scheduling. Implemented as a Haskell
library, their technique requires that the security level of a
thread A that waits on a forked thread B must be at least as
restrictive as the information that inﬂuences the control ﬂow
of thread B. A similar restriction is true of our static mech-
anism: the security level of a program point p that occurs
after execution of program point p0 is at least as restrictive
as information that inﬂuences the scheduling of p0. However,
our static analysis allows us to lower the security level of p
in a particular situation: for a nish s1;s2 statement, the pro-
gram point context of the ﬁrst program point of s2 can be
lower than program point context of the last program point
of s1 if there are no other activities running at the place. The
dynamic nature of the system of Stefan et al. allow them to
be more precise than our static analysis in certain situations,
highlighting the incomparability of static and dynamic ﬂow-
sensitive security [36].
Le Guernic [21] uses a hybrid execution monitor (which
combines static and dynamic analyses) to enforce a strong
security condition. The enforcement mechanism (similar to
the type system of Smith and Volpano [43]) is restrictive:
while loops cannot have high-security guards, and while
loops are not permitted in branches of if commands with
high-security guards. These restrictions are severe enough
to rule out many useful programs.
Process calculi Focardi et al. [11] establish a link be-
tween language-based security for imperative programs, and
process-algebraic frameworks of security properties. How-
ever, they consider only sequential imperative programs,
and do not explore concurrency. Honda et al. [18] present
a security-type system for the -calculus (further devel-
oped by Honda and Yoshida [16, 17]) to address internal
timing and progress channels. In their type system, chan-
nels are assigned security levels, and may be given linear
types. Linear channels must statically have a single send
and receive, which enables precise reasoning about syn-
chronization between processes. Non-linear channels may
have non-deterministic behavior, and processes cannot send
low-security outputs after receiving high-security input on a
non-linear channel, as the resolution of the non-determinism
may be a covert channel. Pottier [32] presents a simpler type
system (without linear channel types, and with a simpler
proof) that also prevents low-security outputs after receiving
high-security input.
Kobayashi [20] presents a type system for -calculus that
allows low-security output after high-security synchroniza-
tion for a variety of synchronization mechanisms. It extends
the idea of linear channels by using types to describe the
channel usage, which permits precise reasoning about the
information ﬂow resulting from synchronization.
Security-type systems Other work concerned with in-
formation security in concurrent systems have also used
security-type systems to enforce strong semantic security
conditions (e.g., [5, 9, 37, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49]). Some
of these previous security-type systems are overly restric-
tive on synchronization between threads, either disallowing
low-security output after synchronization with high-security
threads or activities, or disallowing nondeterminism even
when resolution of the nondeterminism is not inﬂuenced by
high-security information.
The key difference in this work is that we integrate
information-security guarantees with modern concurrency
abstractions (i.e., X10 places). In doing so, we reason about
information at coarser granularity than previous work, which
simpliﬁes reasoning about information ﬂow (and thus, we
believe, leads to increased practicality). Our type system
does not track information ﬂow on a per-location basis, but
ratherfocusesontrackinghowinteractionwithhigh-security
places affects the scheduling of program points at a place.
6. Conclusion
We have extended the X10 concurrent programming lan-
guage with coarse-grained information-ﬂow control. The re-
sulting language, SX10, provides information security for
concurrent programs. Each place is associated with a secu-
rity level, and may only handle data that is appropriate for
the security level. We believe this language provides a bet-
ter intuition for information ﬂow than previous methods for
controlling information ﬂow, and will allow programmers to
write secure programs more effectively.
The security analysis beneﬁts from X10’s abstractions
for concurrency: potentially dangerous information ﬂows
correspond to interactions between places, which are rela-
tively easy to detect, since communication between places
is by message passing. Interaction between places may re-
sult in the scheduling of activities at a place being inﬂu-
enced by high-security information. Through a may-happen-
in-parallel analysis for X10 [22], our security analysis will
determine when this situation may arise, and requires obser-
vational determinism [49] to hold, which prevents activity
scheduling from being a covert information channel. In the
absence of interaction between places with different secu-
rity levels, our security mechanism places no restrictions on
the concurrent program. While some restrictions on concur-
rency necessarily remain, this allows a large class of useful
programs to be written without burdensome synchronization
between threads for the purposes of security.
16This work highlights the opportunity for synergy between
mechanisms for concurrency and mechanisms for informa-
tion security: both rely on reasoning about dependencies
within a program. We believe it is a promising step towards
languages and tools for building secure concurrent systems.
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